



TOWARDS A BETTER CREDIT CARD FRAUD  






For years, credit card fraud has been a major problem in the Indonesian payments system. Numerous 
efforts have been made to mitigate this payment crime. Nevertheless, the high fraud losses recorded in 
particular by banks and other parties in credit card networks suggests that more actions still need to be 
taken. For this, formulation of a sound fraud prevention strategy is paramount to the success in 
combating credit card fraud in a payments system. Such a strategy will ensure that available resources 
are allocated effectively and efficiently. This article, which is based on the author’s PhD research, 
seeks to assess the soundness of the credit card fraud prevention strategy in the Indonesian payments 
system. For analytical purpose, references are made to similar practices in other countries such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The study was conducted using document review 
and interviews and was focusing on the period of 2003 through 2007 The discussions in this article 
conclude that just as in other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, 
the essentials of credit card fraud prevention practice in the Indonesia comprise six key areas of 
resource allocation: understanding of the real problems; fraud prevention policy; fraud awareness; 
technology-based protection, identity management; and legal deterrence.  These six key areas are 
mainly supported by four pillars: user; institution; network; and government and industry. However, 
credit card fraud prevention practice in Indonesia is still at a lower level of robustness than those in the 
benchmark countries. Deficiencies in the credit card fraud prevention practice in Indonesia are 
indicated, inter alia, by a lack of reliable fraud data collection, management and distribution 
mechanisms as well as a lack of effective and efficient identity management practice. Deficiencies and 
weaknesses in the system should be identified and action taken to make it more consistent with credit 
card fraud prevention practices of other countries.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over a decade, credit card fraud has been a major problem in the Indonesian 
payments system. In addition to being costly, the offence is believed to have been 
used to support other crimes such as terrorism. Efforts have been made to address this 
issue among which is by putting in place fraud prevention measures to diminish 
offenders’ crime opportunity. The discussions in this paper focus on highlighting the 
trends in credit card fraud and its prevention in the Indonesian payments system 
particularly in the period of 2003 - 20072
                                                 
1 Author is the Director of the Centre for Forensic Accounting Studies at the Department of 
Accounting of the Islamic University of Indonesia. He obtained his Masters degree and PhD in 
Forensic Accounting from the University of Wollongong Australia. 
.. References are also made to such practices 
2 Some events which occurred after 2007 are included in the discussions because they are related to or 
are part of the events which occur within the study’s time period. 
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in the US, the UK and Australia in building a framework of an ideal credit card fraud 
prevention structure for Indonesia. 
 
PREVALENCE AND COSTS 
Indonesian banks bear tens of billions of rupiahs of losses from credit card fraud 
every year (Kompas.com, 2008b). According to the Indonesia Credit Card 
Association (AKKI), during the period July 2003 to April 2006, 89 cases of credit 
card fraud occurred, with losses of $US4.6 million, of which, 82 cases were 
committed through a counterfeit card fraud scheme (that is, creating forged cards by 
using stolen information), and the rest involved application fraud (Alwie & Anthony, 
2008). According to Mr Dodit Probojakti3
 
 of AKKI, Indonesian banks recorded 
$US4.4 – $US5 million of losses from credit card fraud during 2007 (Kompas.com, 
2008b). 
According to Bank Indonesia (2007b, p. 30), application fraud and counterfeit card 
are the most common schemes of credit card fraud in the country. In terms of 
application fraud, Bank Indonesia believes that careless cardholder selection process 
is commonly the primary cause of credit cards falling into the wrong hands 
(cardholders with bad track records), which leads into the misuse of the cards (Bank 
Indonesia, 2007b, p. 30). As stated by Mr Dodit Probojakti4
 
 of AKKI, the majority of 
counterfeit card fraud cases were in the form of credit cards issued by legitimate 
issuers being forged by criminal syndicates (Kompas.com, 2008b). This was largely 
because most (if not all) credit cards in Indonesia (at least until the issuance of Bank 
Indonesia Regulation Number 7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning the Operation of Card-
Based Payment Instrument Activities) were magnetic stripe based (Bank Indonesia, 
2007b, p. 30). 
Financial loss from credit card fraud is not the only problem faced by the Indonesian 
payments system, because, according to Mr. Muhammad Helmi5
                                                 
3 A member of the AKKI executive board. 
 of AKKI, credit 
4 A member of the AKKI executive board. 
5 Chairman of the AKKI of the time. 
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card fraud can also damage Indonesia’s image in the e-commerce world (Ridwan, 
2005). This is evidenced by the fact that for the last few years, online merchants such 
as Amazon.com and eBay have put Indonesia on their list of ‘dangerous’ countries to 
make online transactions with. eBay, for example, has had many experiences of 
online credit card fraud offenders (carders) from Indonesia who made online 
transactions using unlawfully obtained credit card information (Sodikin, 2006b). 
Such designations diminish the benefits Indonesia could otherwise enjoy from the 
development of world e-commerce. Referring to the experience of Malaysia6
 
, Police 
Brigadier General Indradi Thanos of the Indonesian National Police at the seminar on 
credit card fraud in Bogor (15 April 2008) contends that should Indonesian be 
considered a credit card warning country, all credit card users are warned not to make 
transactions in the country that will impact negatively on banks and the industries 
within (Suara Karya Online, 2008). 
Table 1 Types of Credit Card Fraud in Indonesia 
Using Credit Card 




using forged card  
altered card (re-embossed/re-encoded) 
totally counterfeit 
white plastic card 
Using Sales Drafts 
record of charge (ROC) pumping 
altered amount 
Using Stolen Data Skimming 
                                                 
6  Malaysia had previously been known as among the worst countries in the world for counterfeit card 
fraud. However, since the implementation of smart card technology, it has since been considered a 
very hostile environment for credit card fraud offenders. For example, aaccording to the Visa 
Asia-Pacific’s Head of Payment Security Services, Mr Ingo Noka, at a conference on IT 
governance in Singapore (May 2006), Visa’s loss from counterfeit card fraud was approximately 
$US400,000 in November 2004. As at September 2005, there were no significant indications of 
counterfeit card fraud in Malaysia, and the country had already replaced its magnetic striped 






mail, telepone and internet order 
EDC modification 
fictitious merchant 
common purchase points (CPP) 
credit card generator (CCG) 
Ghost Phantom Terminal 
Source: Indonesian National Police (1998, p. 14). 
 
In practice, categorising credit card fraud is often difficult, because of the complexity 
and the dynamics of the offence (e.g. one offence may involve multiple schemes). 
This creates challenges for law enforcers in investigating and prosecuting offences 
and offenders. This prompted the Indonesian Police, in cooperation with Bank 
Indonesia and other Indonesian banks and financial institutions to issue The Field 
Manual for the Investigation of Credit Card Crime (translated title)7
Table 1
. Based on this 
manual, four major classifications of credit card fraud in Indonesia exist using these 
modus operandi: using credit cards, using sales drafts, using stolen data and other 
methods (see ) (Indonesian National Police, 1998, p. 14). 
 
PATTERN-SETTERS IN PREVENTION PRACTICES 
The Author, based on his PhD study on credit card fraud prevention practices in, 
among others, the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia8, argues that the 
basic structure of a good payments fraud prevention practice resembles a house with 
four pillars that support six key areas9
                                                 
7  See Indonesian National Police (1998, p. 14). 
 (Prabowo, 2010). Author dubbed such a 
8 In his study, Prabowo (2010) analysed the trends in credit card fraud prevention practices in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Indonesia. The ‘Four-Pillared House of 
Payments Fraud’ model was formulated based on the practices in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia against which similar practices in Indonesia is evaluated.    
9 This is also supported by Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI in a discussion with author (Probojakti, 
2008a). Mr Probjakti was of the opinion that generally, there are four pillars (three main pillars 
and one supporting pillar) within the credit card fraud prevention practices in Indonesia: 
customers, issuers, schemes and other stakeholders (e.g. regulators, consumer protection bodies 
and so on) (Probojakti, 2008a). 
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Figure 1 The Four-Pillared House of Payments Fraud Prevention Practice 
Source: Prabowo (2010, p. 362) 
 
A fieldwork conducted in Indonesia in 2008 for the study found that generally the 
same pattern applies to Indonesia, but with somewhat lesser robustness (see the 
following discussions).  
 
The first key area is ‘understanding of the real problems’, in which fraud data 
collection, management and distribution is a major part. A discussion with Mr Dodit 
Probojakti of the Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI)10 suggests that day-to-
day monitoring has been carried out by credit card issuers in Indonesia by various 
means (such as neural-based technology, for example, the Falcon system) to spot 
unusual transactions, as well as other procedures (such as ‘know your customer’11
                                                 
10  A member of the AKKI executive board. 
) 
11 As part of the efforts to circumvent the problems of money laundering, ‘know your customer’ 
(KYC) represents the obligation of financial institutions (e.g. banks and insurance companies) to 
record information about their customers, including ensuring the reliability of that information 
(Innovations Software Technology, 2009, p. 4). 
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that should provide cardholders and financial institutions with a degree of protection 
against fraud (Probojakti, 2008a). 
 
Over the years, efforts to administer fraud data collection have been demonstrated by 
Bank Indonesia’s publishing of such data as part of its payments system annual 
reports12. Additionally, the issuance of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
7/52/PBI/200513 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument 
Activities (e.g. Article 61) created an obligation for bank and non-bank financial 
institutions that operate card-based payment instruments to provide monthly fraud 
reports to Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2005b, p. 43). However, author believes 
that the lack of technical explanation (e.g. how to categorise offences and calculate 
losses) may have affected the reliability of the data, because it may lead to different 
interpretations by different institutions. This was confirmed by Ms Ida Nuryanti14 of 
Bank Indonesia during a discussion with author (Nuryanti, 2008). Ms Nuryanti 
believes that reliable fraud data is of great importance for Bank Indonesia in 
formulating policies to regulate the credit card industry (Nuryanti, 2008). Bank 
Indonesia, since the issuance of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 7/52/PBI/2005 
Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities, and 
recently, Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the 
Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities, has published its card fraud 
statistics as part of its payments system annual reports15
Table 2
. For examples of card fraud 
statistics, see , Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
 
                                                 
12 For examples, see Bank Indonesia  (2007a, p. 142; 2007b, p. 30; 2008b, p. 30). 
13 For the original text, see Bank Indonesia (2005b). The regulation was later on amended by Bank 
Indonesia Regulation Number 10/8/PBI/2008 on the Amendment on Bank Indonesia Regulation 
Number 7/52/PBI/2005 on Card-Based Payment Instrument Operation. In April 2009 Bank 
Indonesia issued Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 concerning Operation of Card-Based 
Payment Instrument Activities as the new regulation on card-based payment instruments (Bank 
Indonesia, 2009b).  
14 A senior legal analyst of Bank Indonesia. 
15 Some publications exist of fraud data based on the data submitted by banks and other financial 
institutions to Bank Indonesia. Nevertheless, the author believes that the absence of regulations 
that create obligations to report fraud that can result in incompleteness of the submitted data would 
affect the reliability of the data in question. 
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Table 2 Card Fraud 2006 




Counterfeiting 5,267            2,783,440  
Lost/Stolen  48,797               211,310  
Card Not Received 369               124,630  
Identity Theft 748               483,120  
Mail/Phone Order  643                  45,540  
Internet Transaction 451                    6,930  
Cash Advance 25                       880  
Application 252               173,910  
Deception 161                  90,860  
Account Takeover 44                    8,250  
Other 143                  66,440  
Total 56,900            3,995,310  
Source: Bank Indonesia (2007b, p. 30). 
Table 3 Card Fraud 2007 




Identity Theft 95.18 19.00 
Card-Not-Received 2.71 1.25 
Counterfeit Card 0.96 61.00 
Deception 0.14 8.15 
Application Fraud 0.06 9.07 
Internet Fraud 0.03 0.01 
Other 0.48 1.21 
Total 100 100 
Source: Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 30). 
Table 4 Card Fraud 2008 (Number of Identified Cases) 
Fraud Type 2007  2008 
Counterfeit 33 11 
Fraud Applications 6 7 
Lost/Stolen  2 1 
Other 1 7 
Total 42 26 
Source: AKKI, cited in Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 52). 
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The examples of card fraud statistics in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 were published 
as part of Bank Indonesia’s payments system annual reports for 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
The data are inconsistently arranged and presented in the reports, and essential 
information, such as descriptions of the categories of offences is lacking; therefore, 
the fraud data collection mechanisms still need to be improved, despite the currently 
existing regulations that obligates financial institutions to report any fraud incidents. 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/ 11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of 
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities, has not made significant improvements 
to the mechanism of fraud data collection, management and distribution, as 
evidenced by, for example, the lack of clear guidance about how to calculate and 
categorise card fraud. 
 
In comparison, the fraud data from the FTC, the APACS and the APCA are always 
presented in consistent and systematic ways that include descriptions about how and 
from whom the data were gathered, as well as the calculation methods (at least in 
general) and offence categorizations. Additionally, should inconsistencies ever occur 




As mentioned above, the obligation to report fraud incidents to Bank Indonesia came 
into existence after the issuance of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument 
Activities, and were later re-established under Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument 
Activities. In Australia, for example, such an obligation is important in maintaining 
the completeness — and thus the reliability — of data and information on fraud. In 
the APCA’s fraud data collection mechanism, for example, all APCA member 
institutions automatically become fraud data sources, and are obligated to provide 
such data as required (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.). Regardless, 
                                                 
16 For example, see Federal Trade Commission (2007a, p. 9) which explain changes in data collection 
method between the 2003 and 2006 identity theft survey reports. 
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the existence of the obligation to report fraud incidents does not in itself solve the 
problems of the lack of reliable data, because further technical guidance on how to 
perform such tasks is also of a high level of importance. The analysis of the relevant 
Bank Indonesia regulations and a discussion with Ms Ida Nuryanti17
 
 of Bank 
Indonesia during the fieldwork both suggest that such technical guidance is yet to be 
developed to avoid misinterpretations in the data collection process in Indonesia. 
Despite the existence of the central bank, an industry body such as the AKKI should 
support the ‘four-pillared house’ as part the fourth pillar, particularly by providing (or 
at least supporting) fraud data collection, management and distribution. As evidenced 
by the roles of the APCA in Australia, an industry body is in a strategic position to 
perform such a function, due to its relationship to the sources of fraud data and 
information (e.g. banks and non-bank financial institutions) (Prabowo, 2010). 
 
Further inquiries into the performance of the AKKI suggest that, despite the fact that 
the institution has been in operation for years18
 
 and has made major contributions to 
solving multiple credit card fraud cases, it could have performed better, had several 
internal problems been solved in the first place. A noticeable problem during the 
author’s visit to the AKKI office was that of the available human resources: only a 
handful of full-time staff, in addition to part-time managerial members, were in 
charge of running the institution. This was confirmed by Mr Dodit Probojakti of the 
AKKI in a discussion with the author (Probojakti, 2008b). Furthermore, as shown on 
its website (accessed on 24 April 2009), there were only two-full time staff in the 
AKKI’s organisational structure, and several unfilled positions. 
According to Mr Probojakti, the limited financial resources is among the major 
problems in developing human resources at the AKKI, because the institution is 
generally funded by its members (Probojakti, 2008b). As for the AKKI’s statements 
in the mass media, particularly in relation to financial losses figures from credit card 
                                                 
17 A senior legal analyst of Bank Indonesia. 
18 The AKKI was established in 1988 (Indonesia Credit Card Association, 2007a). 
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fraud incidents, Mr Probojakti states that such information were requested on a 
strictly confidential basis from credit card schemes (such as Visa and MasterCard), 
and were generally given in the forms of total figures only, thus limiting the author’s 
ability to conduct trend analyses on the data (Probojakti, 2008b). 
 
Referring to the APCA’s Payment Fraud Methodology Paper, a payments system 
institution that conducts fraud data collection, management and distribution should 
consider certain important matters in performing this task, including data items and 
definition, scope and coverage, data reporting and timing, data processing and release 
(Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.). In terms of data items and 
definition, the APCA categories credit card fraud statistics into lost/stolen card, card 
never received, fraudulent application, counterfeit/skimming, card not present (CNP) 
and other (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.). These categories have 
been defined and used consistently over the years. The scope and coverage of fraud 
data collection must be clearly defined regarding from whom the data are collected as 
well as the coverage thereof.  
 
Data reporting and timing refers to the procedures regarding how data are reported 
and how timing issues impact on output from the collections (Australian Payments 
Clearing Association, n.d.). For example, APCA’s member institutions report credit 
and charge card fraud data as gross actual losses, and a three-month period after the 
end of reporting period is required for fraud to be discovered and all relevant details 
thereof acquired (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.). For data 
processing, to maintain consistency and to avoid missing values and other faults that 
may impair the reliability of the data and information, each individual submission is 
checked by the APCA and, when necessary, respondents are contacted to verify 
and/or correct their data and information (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 
n.d.). Even after the data are aggregated (after they are received and checked) to 
produce final totals, the data series is still be checked for consistency (Australian 
Payments Clearing Association, n.d.). After the above matters are sorted out, the 
release of the statistics should also be arranged in a way that avoids (or at least 
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minimises) the lead and lag effects from timing differences in discovering, reporting 
and/or resolving fraud events (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.). Over 
the years, the APCA’s statistics are also provided to institutions such as the 
Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission Australian Payments 
Clearing Association (Australian Payments Clearing Association, n.d.). 
 
In terms of fraud prevention policy, several efforts have been made in Indonesa, 
particularly by Bank Indonesia as the central bank, to set a standard for fraud risk 
management especially regarding card-based payment instruments. This was 
achieved by the issuance of several regulations, such as Bank Indonesia Regulation 
Number 7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based Payment 
Instrument Activities (no longer in effect), Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
10/8/PBI/2008 Concerning the Amendment to Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
7/52/PBI/2005 Concerning Card-Based Payment Instrument Operation (no longer in 
effect) and Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the 
Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (currently in effect). Other 
central bank regulations that directly or indirectly contribute to the mitigation of 
fraud risks in the payments system include, but are not limited to: 
 
 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 3/10/PBI/2001 Concerning the 
Implementation of Know-Your-Customer Principles (Bank Indonesia, 2001a) 
 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 3/23/PBI/2001 Concerning the Amendment 
to Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 3/10/PBI/2001 Concerning the 
Application of Know-Your-Customer Principles (Bank Indonesia, 2001b) 
 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 5/21/PBI/2003 Concerning the Second 
Amendment to Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 3/10/PBI/2001 Concerning 
the Application of Know-Your-Customer Principles (Bank Indonesia, 2003) 
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 Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 9/15/PBI/2007 on Risk Management in the 
Use of Information Technology by Commercial Banks19
 
 (Bank Indonesia, 
2007c). 
Such regulations, when implemented properly, should establish minimum standards 
for card fraud prevention activities, and may help to reduce offence displacement 
problems (e.g. target displacement), because all the supposedly potential victims are 
on the same level of difficulties to be victimised20. According to Bank Indonesia 
Circular Letter Number 11/10/DASP Concerning Card Based-Payment Instrument 
Operations21
 
, in terms of card-based payment instrument security, an issuer has the 
obligation to prevent and minimise card fraud to preserve public trust (Bank 
Indonesia, 2009c, p. 34). Such an obligation covers the entire related technology 
infrastructures, including the security of the card security and the security of the 
entire system of card data processing (Bank Indonesia, 2009c, pp. 34-35). 
For card security, Bank Indonesia has mandated the implementation of chip 
technology with the ability to store and/or to process data, so that various additional 
applications can be added for the sake of the security of transaction data processing 
(Bank Indonesia, 2009c, p. 34). The due date for the conversion to chip technology 
was 31 January 200922
                                                 
19  The regulation established that a bank has the obligation to report any critical events, abuses, and/or 
offences in the management of information technology that may or had already caused significant 
financial losses and/or disturbances on the operation of the bank (Bank Indonesia, 2007c). 
 (Bank Indonesia, 2009c, pp. 35-36). In terms of data 
processing, this includes improvements on the security electronic data capture (EDC) 
devices as well as the supporting transaction processing system of the issuers, 
acquirers and/other third-party processors by providing hardware and systems that 
can process chip cards (Bank Indonesia, 2009c, pp. 34-35). 
20  The displacement theory proposes that diminishing crime opportunity to prevent crime will only 
move it around (New South Wales Attorney General’s Department, n.d.(a)).  
21 A circular letter is generally issued to provide further explanations and guidance to the 
corresponding Bank Indonesia regulation. 
22  The initial due date was the 31 December 2008 as stipulated by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 
7/52/PBI/2005 concerning Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (Bank 
Indonesia, 2005a, p. 11). However, later, due to the difficulties experienced by the industry 
participants in preparing themselves for the migration, the date was changed to 31 December 2009 




Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of 
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (article 27.(3).a), as further explained by 
Bank Indonesia Circular Letter Number 11/10/DASP Concerning Card Based-
Payment Instrument Operations, establishes that, despite all efforts to prevent card 
fraud, should fraud incidents occur, financial institutions are required to submit their 
reports to Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2009b, p. 19; 2009c, pp. 50-60). As 
stipulated by Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the 
Operation of Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities (elucidation, Article 15.(1)), 
issuers and acquirers (e.g. banks and non-bank financial institutions) must also be 
financially prepared to fulfil any future payment obligations arising from credit card 
fraud incidents (Bank Indonesia, 2009b, p. 9). 
 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of 
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities set the standard for fraud risk 
management in credit card industry in Indonesia, among which is the use of the chip 
technology23. However, the experience of the credit card industry in the UK suggests 
that the Indonesian payments system should prepare for the possibility of offence 
displacements, where credit card fraud offenders no longer commit counterfeit card 
fraud but instead focus on other schemes such as card-not-present fraud and 
application fraud, or may even target other card-based payment instruments, such as 
the ATM card (Prabowo, 2010, pp. 200-370)24
 
. 
                                                 
23 As explained by the Circular Letter No. 11/10/DASP concerning Card-Based Payment Instrument 
Operation (Bank Indonesia, 2009c, p. 34). 
24  The author’s review on Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 did not find any part of 
the regulation that creates an obligation for ATM card issuers to switch to smartcard (chip) 
technology. According to the acting Governor of Bank Indonesia, Mr Darmin Nasution, Bank 
Indonesia has not yet mandated the use of chips on ATM cards (Khoiriyah, 2010). Therefore, the 
magnetic stripe technology is still in use for this type of payments card that exposes cardholders to 
the higher risk of payments fraud. Responding to the seemingly increasing ATM skimming cases, 
Bank Indonesia, as stated in its 2010 Annual Report, mandated the National Payment System 
Communication Forum (FKSPN) to formulate a national standard for chip based – ATM/Debit 
cards in Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2011, p. 30). Technically, as agreed by the FKSPN, the 
formulation of such a standard is to be carried out by the Issuer Forum whose members are three 
switching companies: PT. Artajasa Pembayaran Electronis, PT Alto Network, and PT Rintis 
Sejahtera (Bank Indonesia, 2011, p. 30). 
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These issues highlight the need for more regulations on the fraud risk management, 
which in turn covers more areas, such as online credit card fraud transactions and 
ATM card fraud. In other words, future Bank Indonesia regulations on fraud risk 
management should cover more (if not all) areas of payments instruments to 
minimise crime opportunity in the payments system. Regulations on ‘what’ should be 
achieved in terms of fraud prevention should also be accompanied by clear guidelines 
on ‘how’ to achieve this. For example, as discussed above, Bank Indonesia should 
provide more explanations on how financial institutions should arrange their credit 
card fraud data before submitting them to the central bank to avoid confusion and 
misunderstanding. In Australia, for example, the APCA, in its Payment Fraud 
Statistics Methodology Paper, describes the procedures used consistently throughout 
the years and by which the periodic fraud statistics are constructed. 
 
In terms of fraud awareness, several events such as seminars and training events have 
been held often as collaborations among institutions such as Bank Indonesia, the 
Indonesian National Police, the Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI) and 
commercial banks to enhance knowledge and understanding on the modus operandi, 
prevention measures and investigation techniques of credit card fraud in Indonesia. 
For example, a seminar on credit card fraud in the payments system was held on 16 
December 2009 at the Postgraduate Study Program of STIE Perbanas Surabaya, 
whose speakers included Mr Mahmud (Head of Bank Indonesia, Surabaya Office), 
Mr Dodit Probojakti (a member of the AKKI executive board) and Mr Winang 
Budoyo (an economist from Bank CIMB Niaga) (STIE Perbanas Surabaya, 2009). 
The seminar was attended by banking practitioners, academics, students, police and 
credit card users, and aimed to enhance the knowledge of practitioners, students and 
credit card users on the modus operandi and prevention of credit card fraud (STIE 
Perbanas Surabaya, 2009). 
 
The Work Group on Public Education on Banking (2007) states that many problems 
exist between the banking industry and society in banking operations. Among the 
causes of such problems is the lack of society’s knowledge about banking matters 
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(Work Group on Public Education on Banking, 2007). Bank Indonesia has expressed 
its commitment to educating society on banking matters by launching the Blueprint 
of Public Education on Banking in 2007 (Sari, 2007). Among the matters covered by 
the Blueprint was the need to educate society about crimes related to banking 
products to prevent losses (Work Group on Public Education on Banking, 2007). In 
early 2008 Bank Indonesia initiated the Let’s Go to the Bank campaign to educate 
society on banking matters (Nopiansyah, 2008). 2008 was also named the Year of 
Banking Education (PerbanasNews, 2008, p. 2). 
 
As evidenced by the various training events and seminars held for enhancing 
knowledge on the issues of credit card fraud and prevention, it appears that some 
understanding exists of the importance of fraud awareness in tackling credit card 
fraud in Indonesia. However, because many credit card fraud cases are technology-
based crimes that evolve rapidly over time, such initiatives should be continuously 
carried out and improved frequently, particularly for cardholders, because many 
offences were successfully perpetrated by offenders because of customers’ ignorance 
and negligence. The massive ATM fraud in Indonesia in 2010 is an example. The 
offences were perpetrated in different areas in different provinces in Indonesia (e.g. 
Jakarta, Bali, East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and Yogyakarta) in January 2010, 
and were believed to be perpetrated by organised criminals with estimated total losses 
of over $US2 million (Gatra, 2010). Although not specifically targeting credit 
cardholders25
 
, the fact that such offences were perpetrated by means of ‘classic’ 
modus operandi (such as attaching a skimming device and fake customer call centre 
number to an ATM machine and unlawfully installing a hidden camera) suggest the 
lack of customer awareness about the issues of payments fraud (Gatra, 2010; 
Prasetyo, 2010; Kompas.com, 2010). 
In the US, improving society’s fraud awareness has been a major agenda, as 
determined by the countries’ national strategies, including Combating Identity Theft: 
                                                 
25 Because credit cards can also be used to withdraw funds from ATM machines (cash advances), 




A Strategic Plan (US)26
 
. The US FTC, for example, has undertaken various 
initiatives to implement the Strategic Plan, such as a public awareness campaign in 
December 2007 named Deter, Detect, Defend: AvoID Theft, as well as by means of 
websites, articles, brochures, speeches, public service announcements and interviews 
to reach a variety of audiences with a basic message that consumers should take 
simple steps to reduce the risk of identity theft (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 
2008, pp. 17-18). In the UK, during the country’s migration to smartcard technology, 
the Chip and PIN program released publicly available materials for educational 
purposes, such as Get Ready for Chip and PIN (an implementation guide for 
businesses) (Chip and PIN, 2004a)  and The Chip and PIN Guide: Remembering Your 
PIN (Chip and PIN, 2004b). Additionally, after the migration, to educate consumers 
about how to remember and use their Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) the ‘I ♥ 
PIN’ campaign was launched in October 2005 (Chip and PIN, 2005). 
In terms of technology-based protection, as stated by Mr Dodit Probojakti27 of the 
AKKI, in a discussion with the author, every bank and non-bank financial institution 
that operates credit card system in Indonesia generally already has its own protection 
against fraud (Probojakti, 2008a). Recently, because chip technology is recognised 
worldwide as the best standard of card security, the Indonesian credit card industry 
has begun to embrace such technology to tackle credit card fraud, as stipulated by 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of 
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities, with a chip conversion due date of 31 




                                                 
26 Recommendation 8 (Initiate a Multi-Year Public Awareness Campaign). 
27 A member of the AKKI executive board. 
28 According to the Deputy Director of the Directorate of Accounting and Payment System of Bank 
Indonesia, Mrs Yohana Fransiska Sri Suparni, The time needed for the delivery of the cards to the 
cardholders caused a few cardholders had not received their cards by 1 January 2010 and thus 
made the actual percentage of completion in the country’s migration to chip technology slightly 
less than 100 percent on that date (Warta Kota.co.id, 2010). 
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Table 5 Chip Card Implementation (December 2008) 
Issuer Groups Number of Cards Number of Chip Cards % of Chip Cards 
Foreign Banks  2,839,382 1,556,357 55 
Joint Venture Banks  412,224 145,978 35 
Private National Banks 4,200,747 2,434,972 58 
Government Banks 2,781,607 253,092 9 
Non-banks 1,051,370 299,084 28 
Total 11,285,330 4,689,483 42 
Source: Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 49). 
Table 6 EMV Compliant EDC29
Acquirer Groups 
(December 2008) 




% of EMV 
Compliant EDC 
Foreign Banks 5,230 3,000 57 
Private National Banks 110,058 87,530 80 
Government Banks 58,683 15,830 27 
Total 173,971 106,360 61 
Source: Bank Indonesia (2009a, p. 50). 
 
According to Mr Wawan Salum30
 
, of ABN Amro, the migration from magnetic 
stripe-based card to chip-based card requires significant additional investment 
(Wibowo, 2006). Bank BNI for example, plans to spend $US120 million on card 
replacement from magnetic stripe-based to chip-based technology (Berita Sore, 
2008). Bank Mandiri, as the largest state-owned bank in Indonesia, according to its 
Director of Consumers at the time, Mr Omar S. Anwar, would have to spend $US2.5 
million for the conversion (Channel Magazine, 2008(b), p. 6). Bank Danamon has 
allocated approximately $US1 million for upgrading their cards to chip-based 
technology (Channel Magazine, 2008(b), p. 6). 
The statistics in Table 5 and Table 6 suggest that industry participants in Indonesia 
believe that, despite the significant costs of establishing the chip system for fraud 
prevention, the cost savings from the reduction of fraud losses and other benefits will 
                                                 
29 Electronic data capture. 
30 Head of consumer finance of ABN Amro of the time. 
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exceed them, at least in the long run. This was confirmed by Mr Probojakti31
 
, of 
AKKI, in a discussion with the author (Probojakti, 2008a). He believes that 
generally, credit card issuers already perceive the benefits of migration to chip-based 
cards as exceeding its costs, at least in the long run (Probojakti, 2008a). Further, 
according to Mr Probojakti, with chip-based cards, the issuers can have more benefits 
than just the decrease in their fraud losses (Probojakti, 2008a). Such benefits, 
according to Mr Probojakti, can be financial, such as the loyalty programs which can 
only be enjoyed by chip-based cardholders (Probojakti, 2008a). 
Despite the seemingly easier reception of the smartcard technology in Indonesia 
compared to, for example, the US and Australia, referring to the experience of the 
UK, Indonesia may need to prepare itself against the possible adverse consequences 
thereof. For example, APACS fraud statistics indicate that soon after the conversion 
of credit cards in the UK into chip-based cards was completed, total losses from card 
fraud (debit and credit card) increased from $US823.6 million in 2003 to $US989 
million in 2004 (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008b, p. 6). According 
to the APACS, in its press release of 8 March 2005, the increase was partly caused by 
offenders trying to seek and maximise new crime opportunities by focusing on card-
not-present fraud schemes (Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2005). 
Therefore, the Indonesian payments system must prepare itself by strengthening other 
vulnerable areas that may be targeted by credit card fraud offenders after the 
implementation of the smart card technology in the country, for example, by 
strengthening online security in the country to anticipate the growth of card-not-
present schemes. Additionally, and based on the UK’s experience, chip-based credit 
cards commonly still use magnetic stripes to anticipate the needs of cardholders 
travelling to other countries without (or with a slower pace of adoption of) smartcard 
technology (Everett, n.d.). On the other hand, to accommodate the need of overseas 
cardholders who still use magnetic stripe cards, magnetic electronic data captures 
(EDC) are still in use in Indonesia (Surya Online, 2009). Therefore, the risk remains 
of credit card fraud offenders stealing card data from magnetic stripes and using them 
                                                 
31 A member of the AKKI executive board. 
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to commit fraud in other countries that still accept magnetic stripe cards32
 
 
(Association for Payment Clearing Services, 2008a). 
The lack of effective identity management in Indonesia has always been a major 
problem in crime prevention, investigation and prosecution in the country. The ease 
of acquiring false or multiple identity documents for criminal purposes, for example, 
is evidenced by the many cases of serious crime in Indonesia, such as money 
laundering and corruption33. Mr Dodit Probojakti, of AKKI34
                                                 
32 According to the Deputy Director of the Directorate of Accounting and Payment System of Bank 
Indonesia, Mrs Yohana Fransiska Sri Suparni, as of 1 January 2010, the magnetic stripes on 
Indonesian credit cards can no longer be used to make transactions. However, the EDCs can still 
recognise magnetic stripes from overseas cards and accept them (Surya Online, 2009). 
, in a discussion with 
the author, stated that, in practice, credit card issuers have been using various means 
in their customer identification process, including the use of software, the 
implementation of the KYC principle, ID checking, audit trails, ‘matching and cross-
check’ and field surveys (Probojakti, 2008a). Furthermore, as explained by Mr 
Probojakti, cooperation among issuers on fraud data and information sharing for 
background checking has also strengthened existing fraud prevention practices, 
particularly to ensure that credit cards are issued only to trusted people (Probojakti, 
2008a). Finally, as stated by Mr Probojakti, even after an application is approved, 
issuers still monitor the use of the cards to look for any unusual transaction patterns 
that may indicate fraudulent activities (Probojakti, 2008a). However, Mr Probojakti 
also believes that despite these efforts, schemes such as credit card application fraud 
remains a serious threat, due to the lack of effectiveness in identity management in 
Indonesia, which allows credit card fraud offenders to obtain multiple identity 
33 The Head of the Directorate of Compliance and Supervisor of the Indonesian Financial Transaction 
Reports and Analysis Center (INTRAC), Mr Eddy Manindo Harahap, in a discussion with the 
author, suggested that false personal documents such as identity cards, are major obstacles in the 
investigations of many crimes in Indonesia (Harahap, 2008). According to Mr Harahap, whenever 
false identity was involved in a crime, it was generally very difficult to track down, let alone to 
prosecute, the offender (Harahap, 2008). This was also confirmed by the Supervisor of Asset 
Declaration Examiners of the Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia, Mr Najib Wahito, 
in a discussion with the author. Mr Wahito was of the opinion that, in many corruption cases, a 
common way to conceal illegitimate wealth is by having more than one identity with the same 
name, but different addresses (Wahito, 2008). In many cases of terrorism, it is also common for a 
terrorist to have more than one false identity card to distance themselves from the authorities (Adi, 
2009). 
34 A member of the AKKI executive board. 
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documents easily (Koran Jakarta, 2010). According to Mr Probojakti, on average, a 
credit card fraud offender has four ID cards (Koran Jakarta, 2010). 
 
Several initiatives have been prepared to circumvent the problems of identity 
management in crime prevention, investigation and prosecution, among which is the 
development of the Single Identification Number (SIN) system in Indonesia 
(National Coordinating Commitee on the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of 
Money Laundering, 2007, p. 15). The population administration by means of the SIN 
system is not a new concept. The US has been using this system in its social security 
numbers (SSNs) since 1935 (Lusmiarwan & Supangkat, 2005, p. 9). Originally 
created for tracking workers’ earnings, the SSN is now considered an important 
means of identification in the US (President’s Identity Theft Task Force, 2007, p. 23). 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, through his staff member, Mr Denny 
Indrayana, expressed his support for this plan, which is believed will benefit 
Indonesia in many ways, including crime prevention (Khumaini, SBY Desak SIN 
Segera Diwujudkan (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Urges SIN to be Realized), 2009). 
Other areas of use of the SIN include police record, taxation, land administration and 
banking, which all require information on a person’s identity (Henricus & 
Siringoringo, 2009). 
 
Explained by Lusmiarwan and Supangkat (2005, p. 11), the SIN is a unique identity 
integrated with a set of multiple data from different government and private 
institutions so it can be used by different institutions. It has the characteristics of 
being unique (no duplications exist), standardised (the same identity structure is used 
nationwide), complete (it has nationwide coverage), permanent (no changes of data 
occur) and integrated (Lusmiarwan & Supangkat, 2005, p. 11; Suharno, Leksono, & 
Kurniawan, 2004, p. 6). This means that ideally every citizen will have and use only 
one ‘single identity’ for a different range of needs, organisations and areas 
(Lusmiarwan & Supangkat, 2005, p. 12). The information heterogeneity and 
incompleteness in the identity management in Indonesia with lack of communication 
among organizations contributes to: inefficiency in data collection due to redundancy 
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in the process; spatial nature of the information due to the lack of communication 
among organizations in maintaining and developing their data; and misunderstanding 
in interpreting data and information from the same object (Suharno, Leksono, & 
Kurniawan, 2004, p. 6).  
 
The complexity of current identity management systems in Indonesia35 would make 
the centralisation process a very difficult and expensive task. The government plans 
to spend approximately $US737 million on this project, which will be supervised by 
the Corruption Eradication Commission of Indonesia (KPK) to avoid violations such 
as misuse of funds (Wardany, 2009). As stated by the KPK Deputy Chairman for 
Prevention, Mr M. Jasin, in accordance with the Law No. 23/2006 Concerning the 
Population Administration System, the Minister of Home Affairs has only five years 
after the law was enacted to bring the program into realisation (Wardany, 2009). In 
other words, despite slow progress to date, the SIN program must be finished by 
2011 (Wardany, 2009). Despite the technical issues, Swastika (2009) argues that the 
private interests of institutions are a major cause why the SIN has not existed in 
Indonesia until now. This is because to establish the SIN system in Indonesia, 
process–based activities are needed that requires intensive and responsive cross-
sectoral cooperation (Swastika, 2009). February 2011 marks the beginning of the 
nationwide implementation of a national ID system with citizenship numbers as part 
of the electronic identity cards or E-KTP (Prabowo, 2011). This centralized identity 
management system, supervised by the Home Ministry, is designed to be able to 
manage population data for multiple purposes under the same roof (Prabowo, 2011). 
The program is expected to be completed by 201236
                                                 
35 For example,there are approximately 32 institutions that issue different identity numbers for 
documents such as ID cards, family cards, passports, driver’s licences, proof of vehicle ownership 
books (BPKB), birth certificates and electric bills, to name a few, and this often creates confusion 
(Swastika, 2009). 
 (Khumaini, 2011). 
36 Shortly after the initiation of the E-KTP program, problems in the implementation of the system 
began to surface one of which is the seemingly lack of resources to complete the program within 
the predetermined time frame. For example, in the late July 2011 hundreds of E-KTP dedicated 
computers which were meant to be used for the operation of the program failed to be distributed 
to over 260 municipalities in Jakarta (Republika, 2011). The machines were initially scheduled to 





An essential element in SIN system is the establishment of an integrated database of 
subjects (e.g. people and organization) and objects (e.g. land) (Suharno, Leksono, & 
Kurniawan, 2004, p. 9). With this database, data and information can be easily 
accessed, shared, and integrated with other systems. Other benefits include: cross-
sectoral information exchange; more accurate information aspects such as social, 
economics, and environment of a country; ability for assessing income potential for 
taxation purpose; and removing unnecessary redundancy of information; to name a 
few (Suharno, Leksono, & Kurniawan, 2004, pp. 9-10). 
 
The integrated database of the SIN system will make it very difficult for fraud 
offenders to obtain and use multiple and/or false identification documents to commit 
offences (e.g. for making fraudulent credit card applications). Additionally, should an 
offence be committed, the authorities may more easily track down and find offenders 
because all personally identifiable data will be centralised. However, in terms of 
crime opportunity, centralised identity management may reduce it in some areas, but 
increase it in others. This is so because the accumulated data within the database will 
be an attractive target for fraud attacks (London School of Economics, 2005, p. 187; 
Myhr, 2005, p. 22). Based on a study by the London School of Economics (LSE) on 
the UK’s national identity program, common factors that increase the security risk of 
a centralized identity management system include (London School of Economics, 
2005, p. 188): 
 
1. The scale and the complexity of the system  
2. The number of users 
3. The security sensitivity of data held on the system 
4. Whether it has connections to other computer systems, especially untrusted ones 
5. Whether it is connected to the Internet 
6. Whether it is likely to be an attractive target for attack 
 
Therefore, the system has to be very secure to prevent data theft and unauthorized 
modification and at the same time to protect citizens whose data are stored in the 
database (London School of Economics, 2005, p. 187). An identity management 
system should have mechanism to regulate matters such as: processing of personal 
23 
 
data; rights of the data subject; data sharing between administrations; and allowed use 
of the SIN (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 7).  In terms of processing of 
personal data, it should be clear as to whether or not and how the authority needs to 
be notified when personal data is to be processed (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 
2006, p. 5). Rights of data subject include: information and notification right; an 
access right; and a right to object (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 6). Data 
sharing between administrations concerns transfer, sharing, interconnection and 
exchange of personal data between public agencies or administrative authorities by 
means of identifier (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 6). In terms of allowed 
use of the SIN, a major concern has been its use by private institutions especially for 
internal needs (Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2006, p. 6).  
 
To support the development of the SIN system, on 30 January 2009, the Indonesian 
Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (INAFIS) was created by the Indonesian 
National Police and inaugurated by President Yudhoyono (Portal Nasional Republik 
Indonesia, 2009). The system will record data from every Indonesian citizen 
including newborn children (Portal Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2009). Every 
citizen will be given a card with chip in it which records the holder’s personal data 
(Portal Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2009). In supporting the national ID scheme, 
the fingerprint database will prevent redundancy in enrollment and thus prevent the 
ownership of multiple national IDs by a single person (Kristanti & Afrianti, 2009).  
 
In terms of legal deterrence in payments fraud prevention practice in Indonesia, prior 
to the issuance of the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic 
Transactions37
                                                 
37 For the original text, see the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the 
Republic of Indonesia (2008). 
, the prosecution of credit card fraud offenders is generally conducted 
using the Indonesian penal code, which the country inherited from the Dutch colonial 
period, and which is considered insufficient for tackling, in particular, technology-
based offences (GLG Expert Contributor , 2008). For example, according to Mr 
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Dodit Probojakti38 of the AKKI, the case of counterfeit card fraud perpetrated by 
Beny Wong, who received a five-year, eight-month jail sentence, was known at the 
time as the highest sentence ever for a credit card fraud case in Indonesia 
(Hukumonline.com, 2007). Previously, perpetrators of credit card fraud (such as 
Herry Komet in Bandung, Tan Wo Siang and Ripin Kasim in Jakarta and Chandra 
Halim in Surabaya) were sentenced to a maximum of four years in prison 
(Hukumonline.com, 2007). As stated by the Police Brigadier General Indradi Tanos 
of the Indonesian Police at the seminar on the law enforcement of credit card in 
Indonesia (15 April 2006), the weak legal sanctions, as found in the penal code, has 
made credit card fraud syndicates keep repeating their offences (Sebayang, 2008). Mr 
Mohamad Helmi of AKKI39
 
 contends that the perpetrators of credit card fraud in 
Indonesia who were prosecuted by using the penal code would receive the maximum 
sanction of only five to six years of imprisonment; whereas in other countries (such 
as Malaysia, Singapore and Australia), the sanctions for the same offence are more 
severe (Ridwan, 2005). 
According to the Police Great Commissioner Adjutant Dharma Pongrekun of the 
Indonesian National Police, regardless of the efforts made by the Indonesian National 
Police to counter credit card fraud, the relatively light sanctions for offenders has 
made Indonesia a safe haven for credit card fraud offenders (Hukumonline.com, 
2004). Furthermore, as stated by Mr Pongrekun, indications exist that migrations of 
credit card offenders from Malaysia and Thailand to Indonesia have occurred due to 
this situation (Hukumonline.com, 2004). 
 
The use of technology to support crime in Indonesia has created new challenges for 
the law enforcement institutions to conduct investigations into offences and prosecute 
offenders. A major city in Indonesia, Yogyakarta, for example, was known a few 
years ago as a haven for online credit card fraud offenders, as well being as among 
the worst places in the world for online credit card fraud. This was confirmed by the 
                                                 
38 AKKI risk management coordinator at the time; currently a member of the executive board of 
AKKI. 
39 Chairman of AKKI at the time. 
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Police Commissioner Adjutant Tri Wiratmo of the Yogyakarta Provincial Police 
(Polda DIY), who had years of experience in the investigation of credit card fraud in 
Yogyakarta, in a discussion with the author (Wiratmo, 2008). According to Mr 
Wiratmo, among the major difficulties of the investigation and prosecution of online 
credit card fraud offences and online credit card fraud offenders are (Wiratmo, 2008): 
 
 victims are often from different jurisdictions (that is, overseas) 
 offenders are very difficult to track down and apprehend, due to their use of 
technology 
 the law at the time had not yet regulated matters such as cybercrime and 
electronic evidences 
 the complexity of the technology enabled crimes that required law enforcers to 
possess high level of skills and knowledge to conduct the investigations, which 
often created human resource problems40
 
. 
Efforts have been made to circumvent such problems by, for example, establishing 
networks of cooperation with the international law enforcement agencies such as 
Interpol. According to Mr Wiratmo, even with such cooperation, inter-jurisdictional 
cases will still take a long time to solve (Wiratmo, 2008). 
 
As mentioned above, a major effort made by the Indonesian government in 
mitigating the threats from technology supported crimes was the passing of the Law 
No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic Transactions in April 200841. 
According to Mr Mohammad Nuh42
                                                 
40 This matter has been addressed by, for example, The Field Manual Book of the Investigation of 
Credit Card Crime and the training events conducted by institutions such as the AKKI and Bank 
Indonesia (see the above discussion). 
, the law generally covers various aspects of the 
use of information and communication technology, including crimes within (Ministry 
of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008, 
p. v). Among the important matters regulated by this law is the use of electronic 
41 See Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of Indonesia (2008, p. 
30). 
42 Minister of communication and information technology at the time. 
26 
 
information and/or electronic documents as legitimate legal evidences as the 
expansion of legitimate legal evidence pursuant to the Law of Procedure (Article 5) 
(Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of the Republic of 
Indonesia, 2008, p. 7). With such matters already regulated within, the law has been 
fully supported by the Indonesian National Police, because previously, it was very 
difficult (if not impossible) to use electronic documents as evidence (Yanuarti, 2008). 
According to the Head of the IT and Cybercrime Unit of the Criminal Investigation 
Bureau (Bareskrim) of the Indonesian National Police, Police Grand Commissioner 
Petrus Reinhard Golose, the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and 
Electronic Transactions is the first ‘legal umbrella’ for law enforcers to tackle 
electronic crime in cyberspace, and is considered as an outstanding accomplishment 
(Yanuarti, 2008). 
 
Mr Iwan Setiawan43 of Bank Indonesia, in a discussion with the author, explained 
that the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic Transactions has 
adopted several international regulations, guidance and practices, such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Electronic Signatures 2001 and the European Union’s Convention on Cyber 
Crime (ETS no. 185, 2001)44
 
 (Setiawan, 2008).  
In terms of legal deterrence, the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and 
Electronic Transactions imposes higher sanctions, particularly for credit card fraud 
offenders in terms of jail sentences and fines, which can strengthen the area of legal 
deterrence. This was confirmed by Mr Dodit Probojakti45 and Mr Ferry Tupanno46
                                                 
43 IT senior system analyst of Bank Indonesia. 
, 
both of AKKI, in a discussion with the author (Probojakti, 2008a; Tupanno, 2008a). 
According to Mr Probojakti, before 2004, the average jail sentence for credit card 
fraud offender was approximately one year, and later on became 2.5 years after 2004, 
with the case of Beny Wong in Bali receiving the highest sentence (five years, eight 
44 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (1999; 2002) and Council of Europe 
(2001). 
45 A member of the executive board of the AKKI. 
46 Risk management coordinator of the AKKI. 
27 
 
months) (Probojakti, 2008a). With the maximum of 12 years of imprisonment, the 
Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic Transactions is expected 
to have a better deterrence effect than previous laws.  
 
Despite the numerous criticisms of the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information 
and Electronic Transactions (for examples, the use of misleading definitions and 
overly severe sanction)47
 
, all focus on its substance, but do not criticise its existence. 
Basically, the law itself represents the state’s efforts to fulfil its responsibility to 
provide maximum protection for information and communication technology 
utilisation in the Indonesia (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology 
of the Republic of Indonesia, 2008, p. v). 
The existence of cyberlaw in Indonesia to provide sufficient legal deterrence will not 
be a significant contribution for the payments fraud prevention practice, should law 
enforcers not be equipped with sufficient skills and experience to conduct 
investigations and bring offenders to the courts (Elly, 2008). As previously 
mentioned, the limited human resources for tackling technology-based crimes has 
always been a major problem for the Indonesian National Police. This is because 
offenders often possess extensive knowledge of information and communication 
technology, surpassing those of law enforcers (Elly, 2008). An Indonesian 
telecommunication and informatics expert, Mr Roy Suryo, states that during 2008, in 
32 Provincial Police (Polda) offices, only approximately 12 had cybercrime units, 
and that this suggests the need for more personnel with sufficient knowledge on 
technology-related crimes (Lobo, 2008; Suara Pembaruan Daily , 2008). According 
to the Head of Unit V IT and Cybercrime of the Criminal Investigation Bureau 
(Bareskrim) of the Indonesian National Police, Police Grand Commissioner Petrus 
Reinhard Golose, despite the enormity of the problem, the Indonesian National Police 
as law enforcer is not yet prepared to handle cybercrime cases (Kompas.com, 2008a). 
Further, Mr Golose states that handling cybercrime cases depends heavily on 
improving human resources within the police institution itself (Kompas.com, 2008a). 
                                                 
47 For examples, see Effendi (n.d.) and Kompas.com (2009). 
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According to Mr Golose, this matter not only concerns having police officers who 
know about using computer, but is also about how to ‘create’ police officers who are 
capable of investigating computer-related crimes (Kompas.com, 2008a). For this, Mr 
Golose recommends having special education on cyberspace and the use of computer 
hardware and software in cybercrime investigations in the Indonesian Police 
Academy, police school and the Police Science University (Kompas.com, 2008a). 
 
Referring to the experience of the US, such problems are common and will always be 
encountered by law enforcers in investigating technology-enabled crimes. One of the 
President’s Identity Theft Task Force’s recommendations in its Strategic Plan is to 
‘Enhance training for law enforcement officers and prosecutors’ (Recommendation 
30) (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, p. 46). The increase in the number 
of regional identity theft seminars as well as the review on the curricula for the 
education and training of federal agencies’ officers are examples of responses to this 
recommendation (President's Identity Theft Task Force, 2008, pp. 46-47). Referring 
to the experience of the UK, establishing special units, task forces, or networks to 
mitigate the threats of payments fraud should also strengthen the area of legal 
deterrence in payments fraud prevention practices. For example, the Dedicated 
Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit (DCPCU) was established in 2002 to tackle organised 
criminal networks that commit cheque and plastic card fraud in the UK, and is 
supported by investigators from various institutions such as the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS), the City of London Police (CoLP) and civilian investigators 
(National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2009b, p. 51; Dedicated Cheque and Plastic 
Crime Unit, n.d.). 
 
Success in the above key areas requires the roles of users, institutions, networks and 
government and industry as the four ‘pillars’ of the payments fraud prevention. 
Customers, as part of the user group, can participate in training events and seminars 
held to improve their awareness on the current fraud issues, which should encourage 
cautious behaviour when using credit cards and thus provide fewer crime 
opportunities for offenders. By reporting fraud incidents to their financial institutions 
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as soon as they occur, customers can also support fraud data collection, management 
and distribution as part of the efforts to understand the real problems. 
 
Financial institutions, as part of the institution group in the four pillars, can contribute 
to the above recommendations by allocating resources to acquire the latest credit card 
fraud prevention technology, conducting customer education programs and becoming 
part of the fraud data collection, management and distribution process in the country. 
Credit card associations, as part of the network group, can establish rules of 
operation48
 
 for the network participants, including security standards within (e.g. 
EMV for smart cards and PCI DSS for online transactions), as well as contribute to 
the fraud data collection, management and distribution process. 
In the fourth group, government and industry, Bank Indonesia, as the central bank, in 
fulfilling its responsibility to promote safety and efficiency in the payments system, 
can formulate regulations on fraud risk management for the Indonesian credit card 
industry. Institutions such as the Indonesian National Police are in a position to 
support credit card fraud prevention in Indonesia by creating deterrences to 
discourage offenders or potential offenders from committing offences. 
 
The Author  believes that the ‘four pillars’ can be strengthened further by advancing 
the roles of the credit card industry body, the Indonesia Credit Card Association 
(AKKI)49
                                                 
48 For examples, see Rules for Visa Merchants: Card Acceptance and Chargeback Management 
Guidelines (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2007); Visa U.S.A. Inc. Operating Regulations: Volume I — General 
Rules (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2008a); and Visa U.S.A. Inc. Operating Regulations: Volume 2 — Dispute 
Resolution Rules (Visa U.S.A. Inc., 2008b). 
. In Australia, for example, the Australian Payments Clearing Association 
(APCA) has been part of that country’s efforts to mitigate the threats of payments 
fraud by, for example, continuous monitoring of the trends thereof (Australian 
49 In the Indonesian payment system, the Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI) has been known 
as the country’s premier credit card industry body, whose primary objectives include (Indonesia 
Credit Card Association, 2007b): 
▪ bridging banks and financial institutions that issue credit cards with other parties that are 
committed to the development of healthy credit card industry 
▪ supporting the investigation of credit card fraud by providing expert witnesses from the industry 
practitioners, as well as from the representations of international credit card schemes such as 
MasterCard and Visa International. 
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Payments Clearing Association, 2009, p. 3). As the Australia’s payments industry 
self-regulatory organisation, the APCA has been a major source of payments fraud 
data and information in Australia, which supports payments fraud prevention in the 
country. As stated by the APCA (2009, p. 7): 
 
APCA believes that effective systematic prevention is greatly assisted by reliable 
statistical information about levels of fraudulent activity. …In simple terms, what gets 
measured, gets managed. 
 
Over the years, discussions have emerged about establishing similar self-regulatory 
organisation in Indonesia to represent the adoption of self-regulatory system in the 
country50
 
. Such a plan has been mentioned by Bank Indonesia in its payments system 
annual reports (2007 and 2008) (Bank Indonesia, 2008b, pp. 39-66; 2009a, pp. 24-
42). Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 39) contends that the primary objective of the 
establishment of a credit card industry self-regulatory organisation (SRO) is to allow 
the industry to decide on its own rules and standards for small and technical matters, 
on its own. Further, according to Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 66), the commitment to 
establish a payments system SRO forms part of the efforts to improve the roles of the 
stakeholders in the development of payments systems based on market need. 
According to Bank Indonesia (2008b, p. 66), by implementing a self-regulatory 
system, a central bank can focus on macro regulation; whereas the area of micro and 
technical regulation is covered by the SRO. For example, because Bank Indonesia 
                                                 
50 Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI, in a discussion with the author, was of the opinion that among the 
first priorities in developing the Indonesian credit card industry in particular, and the Indonesian 
payments system in general, is the adoption of the self-regulatory system by establishing a self-
regulatory organisation (SRO) (Probojakti, 2008a). Further, Mr Probojakti believed that the AKKI 
is a good candidate to be upgraded into a self-regulatory organisation that will grant the institution 
several powers to regulate itself (e.g. deciding rules for the credit card industry, such as those 
related to minimum payment, non-performing loan (NPL) calculation and merchant certification) 
(Probojakti, 2008a). This was also confirmed by Mr Ferry Tupanno, in a discussion with the author 
(Tupanno, 2008a). Mr Tupanno stated that in its current state, the AKKI generally has no binding 
rules, and this causes difficulties, particularly for decision-making process as well as collecting 
fraud data from its members — despite the available database tools (Tupanno, 2008a). 
Additionally, Mr Harrold Abraham Gaspersz of the AKKI, in a discussion with the author, 
suggested that not all credit card fraud cases are addressed by the AKKI, only those of significant 
value (Gaspersz, 2008b). 
31 
 
Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of Card-Based 
Payment Instrument Activities does not provide clear technical guidance on the 
mechanism of fraud data collection, management and distribution, an SRO can fill 
this gap by setting up such a mechanism to promote the reliability of the generated 
information. Alternatively, and just as with the case of the APCA51, a future SRO 
could coordinate the collection of fraud data from its members to be submitted later 
on to the central bank, as well as to other relevant law enforcement institutions. For 
this purpose, a future SRO may need to consider establishing an equivalent of the 
APCA’s fraud committee52 to administer the process. Therefore, the formulated rules 
and standards could promote and maintain the security of the credit card instrument 
as well as maintaining healthy and efficient competition in the market (Bank 
Indonesia, 2008b, p. 39). In December 2007 the agreement between the card issuers 
who were also AKKI members to form an SRO was signed5354
 
 (Bank Indonesia, 
2008b, p. 39). Finally, on 20 October 2010, facilitated by Bank Indonesia, a Self 
Regulatory Organization, the Payment System Association of Indonesia (ASPI) was 
formed by various banking organizations such as the Indonesia Credit Card 
Association (AKKI), the Foreign Bank Association of Indonesia, the Indonesian 
Banks Association (Perbanas) and the Indonesian Sharia Bank Association 
(Asbisindo) (Bank Indonesia, 2011, p. 35). The ASPI was legalized on 11 November 
2010 (Bank Indonesia, 2011, p. 35). 
                                                 
51 See Australian Payments Clearing Association (n.d.). 
52 The APCA’ s fraud committee holds a meeting every calendar quarter to monitor the trends in 
payments fraud in Australia, as well as developing the most appropriate countermeasures based on, 
among other things, the collected fraud data and information (Australian Payments Clearing 
Association, n.d.). 
53 Confirmed by Mr Ferry Tupanno, in a discussion with the author (Tupanno, 2008b). However, as 
implied in the author’s discussion with Mr Dodit Probojakti of the AKKI, the conflicts of interests 
occur because many of the AKKI’s professional staff are also employed by other institutions as 
members of their institutions’ top management level, has made the SRO establishment process 
progress somewhat slower than expected (Probojakti, 2008a).  
54 Finally, on 20 October 2010, facilitated by Bank Indonesia, a Self Regulatory Organization, the 
Payment System Association of Indonesia (ASPI) was formed by various banking organizations 
such as the Indonesia Credit Card Association (AKKI), the Foreign Bank Association of Indonesia, 
the Indonesian Banks Association (Perbanas) and the Indonesian Sharia Bank Association 
(Asbisindo) (Bank Indonesia, 2011, p. 35). The ASPI was legalized on 11 November 2010 (Bank 




In terms of payments fraud prevention in Indonesia, theoretically, with greater 
understanding of the actual problems, a self-regulatory organisation should be able to 
allocate the existing resources more effectively to design and implement the most 
appropriate fraud prevention strategy. According to Dr. Brad Pragnell of the APCA 
in a discussion with author, in an SRO, the parties who make the decisions would 
also be those who would bear the consequences (e.g. financial costs) thereof 
(Pragnell, 2010). Therefore, their decisions related to payments fraud prevention 
should be effective as well as efficient. However, in practice, the nature of a self-
regulatory organisation may also create some challenges in achieving its objectives, 
including those of fraud prevention. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses of a self-regulation system has been the subject of 
many studies in various disciplines55
 
. As defined by Nunez (2007, p. 210): 
As the name suggests, self-regulation is essentially a scheme whereby the enforcement 
of quality is delegated to the suppliers. The whole rationale for self-regulation rests on 
the notion that suppliers must somehow form an organization (namely a Self-Regulatory 
Organization (SRO)) in order to monitor the quality provided by its members and 
disclose evidence of malpractice and product failure to consumers. 
 
Whereas the system itself is considered to be a means to improve performance at 
lower costs more quickly than traditional command-and-control regulation, evidence 
such as the collapse of Enron and WorldCom56, suggest the need for greater 
government intervention (Sullivan, 2002, p. 91). The major challenges in operating a 
self-regulatory organisation (SRO) are often related to how to manage various 
interests within so as to avoid (or at least minimise) the conflicts thereof57
                                                 
55 For examples, see Sullivan (2002); Hilary and Lennox (2005); Cunningham and Harris (2006); 
Lenox (2006); Lenox and Nash (2003); and King and Lenox (2000). 
. The 
ICPACE, in its guideline, the Principles of Payments Industry Self-Governance, 
formulates five principles that characterise a sound self-governance framework for a 
56 The issues of self-regulation in the Enron case centre on the roles of external auditors (Arthur 
Andersen, LLP) who was unlawfully supporting the misleading accounting practices within the 
company. Many believed this failur highlighted the need for reforming the accounting industry’s 
self-regulation — at least in the US. See Vinten (2002); Sullivan (2002); and Hilary and Lennox 
(2005). 




payments system: certainty, legitimacy, transparency, flexibility and efficiency 
(International Council of Payment Association Chief Executives, 2007, p. 2). 
 
Regarding fraud prevention, the author believes that a major role of a self-regulatory 
organisation (SRO) is to set the standards of security for its members, for example, 
by policies or regulations to mandate the use of a certain fraud prevention measure 
for credit card transaction. However, this would present the SRO with the challenge 
of ensuring the compliance of its members to the standards. Lenox and Nash (2003, 
p. 353), referring to the experiences of four US trade associations58
 
, contends that the 
failure of an SRO in ensuring the compliance of its members will contribute to the 
failure of the institution in achieving its objectives. Members’ compliance can be 
achieved by a variety of means, among which are explicit sanctions (Lenox & Nash, 
2003, p. 343; King & Lenox, 2000, p. 713). However, sanctions are better 
administered by independent parties so as to avoid conflicts of interest, because an 
SRO can be limited in some ways, such as simply because it is ultimately governed 
by its members (King & Lenox, 2000, p. 713). These also suggest the need to have in 
place a sound mechanism for monitoring compliance (Lenox & Nash, 2003, p. 354).  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summary, from the above discussions about the ‘four-pillared house’ framework 
perspective, various efforts have been made, particularly in the Indonesian payments 
system, involving four key groups (user, institution, network and government and 
industry) to support the six key areas of payments fraud prevention: understanding 
the real problems, fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness, technology-based 
protection, identity management and legal deterrence. In each of these key areas, this 
study has identified at least one event or measure as a trendsetter, and this has formed 
the focus of discussions. The following sections examine proposed future 
improvements for the six key areas, based on the above discussions and the practices 
in the benchmark countries. 
                                                 
58 The American Chemistry Council (ACCC), the National Association of Chemical Distributors 
(NACD), the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) and the American Forest and 




Understanding the Real Problems 
Although some efforts have been made, particularly by Bank Indonesia, to gather, 
manage and disseminate payments fraud data from the victim side (e.g. from 
consumers’ complaints) by, for example, creating obligations for financial 
institutions to report any fraud incidents to the central bank, more should be done to 
improve the reliability of the information generated from such a mechanism. This 
includes creating clear guidelines on how to record, calculate and report fraud 
incidents to the central bank. Such guidelines must address matters such as data items 
and definition, scope and coverage, data reporting and timing, data processing and 
release (see the above discussions). 
 
To support these procedures, the establishment of a special database such as that of 
the FTC’s Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse is worthy of consideration, at least in 
the future, Expanding data sources to include more than just victims (e.g. offender 
data) should also to add to the reliability of the information. Parties from the 
Indonesian criminal justice system (e.g. Indonesian police and prosecutors) who 
handle the investigation of offenders might effectively collaborate with, for example, 
parties from the payment system (e.g. Bank Indonesia and the commercial banks) 
which handle the complaints from victims to synchronise their data from both sides 
(victim and offender) to construct a more complete picture on the actual fraud 
problems that need to be solved. Just as in the US, the UK and Australia, where 
various institutions use the fraud data from the FTC, the APACS and the APCA to 
support their crime prevention, investigation and prosecution efforts, institutions in 
Indonesia may also gain benefit from using reliable fraud data, at least from the 
victim side, as a basis for their decision-making processes. However, due to the 
sensitive nature of the data, the mechanism of fraud data collection, management and 





Fraud Prevention Policy 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/11/PBI/2009 Concerning the Operation of 
Card-Based Payment Instrument Activities59
 
 mandates participants in credit card 
networks (e.g. issuers, acquirers and associations) to promote safety in their systems 
(Bank Indonesia, 2009b, pp. 6-21). Among the matters governed by the regulation is 
the use of chip technology on credit cards, which is understandably important, 
considering the fact that counterfeit card fraud is one of the most common types of 
credit card fraud in Indonesia, because the country was previously still relying on 
magnetic stripe technology. 
However, because counterfeit card fraud is not the only types of credit card fraud and 
that offenders will tend to shift their offences to other vulnerable areas (e.g. other 
targets or by using other methods, such as what occurred in the UK), this study 
believes that Bank Indonesia needs to seriously consider advancing its regulations to 
cover more areas, so that the benefits of the implementation of the chip technology 
will not be offset by the increase of losses from other fraud schemes (e.g. card-not-
present and application fraud). Despite the high investment required, mandating 
financial institutions to comply with the online security standards of the Payment 
Card Industry Security Standard Council (PCI SSC), at least in the future, may help 
to reduce offenders’ crime opportunities by limiting the options for displacements. 
Alternatively, Bank Indonesia may require the industry to use and develop online 
fraud measures such as Verified by Visa, MasterCard SecureCode, address 
verification services (AVS) and card verification numbers (CVNs), to name a few. 
 
To anticipate the possibility that offenders will also shift their offences to application 
fraud, Bank Indonesia may also take advantage of the future Single Identification 
Number (SIN) system in Indonesia, which should limit offenders’ ability to obtain 
multiple and/or false identity documents for credit card applications. Therefore, this 
                                                 
59 Accompanied by the Circular Letter No. 11/10/DASP concerning Card-Based Payment Instrument 
Operation that provides explanatory information. 
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study suggests that when the SIN system is up and running, Bank Indonesia (or any 
other relevant institution) should consider formulating a specific regulation on the 
credit card application process to ensure that the applicants are really who they say 
they are. In Australia, for example, such a procedure is part of the 100-point 
identification system, which requires any individual who wishes to open an account 
to provide multiple independent sources of identification (Smith, 1998, p. 4). Such 
procedures will make the Indonesian payments system a particularly hostile 
environment for credit card fraud application offenders. Finally, to support fraud data 
collection, management and distribution, Bank Indonesia, in its regulations, may 




Despite a range of initiatives, such as training events and seminars on credit card 
fraud and other current issues, more should be done to enhance society’s awareness 
on the issues of credit card fraud and credit card fraud prevention in Indonesia. Due 
to the rapidly evolving nature of technology-enabled crime, more intensive and 
extensive education on credit card fraud prevention is needed in Indonesia to educate 
society. For example, due to the recent chip conversion (1 January 2010) in the 
country, some members of society may still need to be educated on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the new system, because, for example, although the chip technology 
can tackle counterfeit card fraud, it provides less (if not no) protection against card-
not-present fraud such as online credit card fraud (Prabowo, 2010). Therefore, 
consumers need to be made aware of the other security options, such as 3D secure 
technology (e.g. Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode) when making 
transactions online. As practised in the benchmark countries, a range of means of 
education, such as seminars, training events, workshops, educational websites with 
online materials, advertisements, brochures and pamphlets, to name a few, can be 
employed to educate the society. An aware society will ‘unwillingly’ provide less 





In terms of technology-based protection, smartcard technology is the recent 
trendsetter in Indonesia. As of 1 January 2010, all credit cards in Indonesia have been 
equipped with chips (Bank Indonesia, 2009c, pp. 35-36). However, as suggested by 
the above recommendation on the area of fraud prevention policy employing a 
particular technology to reduce crime opportunity in a particular area may contribute 
to offenders shifting their offences to other, more vulnerable areas. To prevent this, 
the Indonesian credit card industry should also work on strengthening its defence 
against other credit card fraud schemes, such as card-not-present and application 
fraud. For card-not-present fraud, referring to the experience of the US and the UK as 
depicted by CyberSource’s annual studies60
 
, various online security measures such as 
address verification services (AVS), card verification numbers (CVNs), IP 
geolocation information, Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode have been 
employed to tackle online credit card fraud. In the US, the PCI Data Security 
Standard for online transaction security has gained favourable reception. For 
example, approximately 95 per cent of large Visa merchants already comply with the 
standard (Visa U.S.A., 2009). For application fraud, as mentioned above, in relation 
to the future establishment of the Single Identification Number (SIN) in Indonesia, 
the Indonesian credit card industry might establish and develop systems or 
applications that can be used in conjunction with the SIN system to verify applicants’ 
identity to protect itself from identity-related fraud. In principle, in terms of 
technology, what the credit card industry must do to protect its customers is to plug 
as many loopholes as possible to minimise (if not eliminate) credit card offenders’ 
opportunities to commit their offences in Indonesia. 
Identity Management 
As stipulated by the Law No. 23/2006 Concerning the Population Administration 
System, by 2011, the Single Identification Number (SIN) system is scheduled for 
operation in Indonesia (Wardany, 2009). Although the complete application of the 
system is yet to be seen, basically, should this system be already up and running, 
                                                 
60 For examples, see CyberSource (2008, p. 6) and CyberSource UK (2008, p. 11). 
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identity management in Indonesia will be more centralised than before. This will 
bring benefits, among which is the difficulty for credit card fraud offenders to obtain 
multiple and/or false documents for fraudulent purposes. However, based on the 
experience of the UK’s National Identity Scheme, being too excessive in 
implementing centralized identity management within a country will result in more 
problems than benefits for the society (Prabowo, 2010). Among the major drawbacks 
of an excessively centralized identity management system is the fact damages from 
data breaches will be more severe compared to those of a less centralized system. 
Furthermore, society may perceive the system as a form of surveillance and is a 
threat to their privacy which in turn will result in the resistance to the system itself. It 
is of outmost importance that the Indonesian government considers establishing a 
sound mechanism (e.g. by policy or technology) to control the use of the SINs by 
institutions to avoid unnecessary use that may increase the risk of identity theft. 
Above all, Indonesian government should carefully assess how far the centralization 
will go so as to avoid having too many problems in the future.  
 
Legal Deterrence 
The first Indonesian cyberlaw, the Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and 
Electronic Transactions, has strengthened the area of legal deterrence in Indonesia, 
particularly that related to credit card fraud in the form of higher sanctions for 
offenders. In other words, the law now supports Indonesian law enforcers in 
investigating credit card fraud offences as well as prosecuting offenders. Therefore, 
the next important step is to enhance the knowledge and skills of law enforcers to be 
able to enforce the law effectively. To achieve this, proactive efforts to educate law 
enforcers should be undertaken, including reviewing the curricula of the law 
enforcement education institutions as well as conducting training and seminars for 
law enforcers. Cooperation with industry practitioners may also support such efforts. 
For example, industry experts may share their fraud data to be used to educate the 
law enforcers. The existence of both effective law on technology-related crimes and 
effective law enforcers with extensive knowledge and skills in the investigation and 
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prosecution of such crimes will discourage offenders from committing their offences 
in Indonesia. 
 
Strengthening the Pillars 
As discussed above, among the future plans to promote the safety and efficiency in 
the Indonesian payments system is the establishment of a credit card industry self-
regulatory organisation (SRO). As a payments system SRO, ASPI is expected to 
support the Indonesian payments system by, among other things, deciding on the 
most effective and efficient ways to achieve the objectives set by the government. 
Nevertheless, the operation of ASPI particularly for the credit card industry in 
Indonesia must be carefully planned, including the targeted objectives to be achieved 
as well as means (e.g. regulations and policies) to achieve them. To ensure the 
achievement of the objectives, mechanisms to ensure the compliance of members 
must also exist, which may include explicit sanctions as well as sound monitoring 
processes. Additionally, the Indonesian government must always monitor the 
progress of the self-regulation system so as to decide properly the time when 
intervention is needed and how far the intervention should go. 
 
To further strengthen the four ‘pillars’ of payments fraud prevention in Indonesia, 
referring to the experience of the US and the UK, where payments fraud level is 
relatively high compared to Australia, the establishment of a special task force to 
coordinate the available resources in circumventing fraud problems is worthy of 
consideration. For example, the President’s Identity Theft Task Force was established 
in May 2006 to coordinate federal agencies in the US in combating identity theft and 
was charged with creating a strategic plan for such a purpose (Finklea, 2009, p. 5). 
Similarly, in the UK, the National Fraud Strategic Authority (NFSA) was established 
in October 2008 as an executive agency of the Attorney General’s Office to protect 
the economy from fraud through the creation of a more hostile environment for 
offenders (National Fraud Strategic Authority, 2008). Establishing a special task 
force for tackling a serious crime is not a new matter in Indonesia, because 
previously, the country had already established the Corruption Eradication 
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Commission of Indonesia (KPK) for combating corruption, and the Indonesian 




Over the years, Indonesia has allocated resources to counter the growing problem of 
credit card fraud. This includes the six key areas of payments fraud prevention: 
understanding the real problems, fraud prevention policy, fraud awareness, 
technology-based protection, identity management and legal deterrence. Due to the 
growing threat of credit card fraud, particularly that caused by offenders shifting 
offences to Indonesia from other countries that have already strengthened their 
defences, recent efforts to protect consumers from fraud have been intensified, 
particularly in the six key areas: understanding the real problems, fraud prevention 
policy, fraud awareness, technology – based protection, identity management and 
legal deterrence (Prabowo, 2010).  
 
Major prevention measures in these areas include: publication of fraud data by Bank 
Indonesia, formulation of fraud risk management policy by Bank Indonesia, seminars 
and training events about credit card fraud and prevention, implementation of the 
chip technology, development of the Single Identification Number (SIN) and the 
enactment of Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Electronic 
Transactions. Additionally, as part of the efforts to strengthen in particular the fourth 
pillar (government and industry) of the payments fraud prevention, a credit card 
industry SRO is planned to be established in the near future. All these efforts will at 
least reduce crime opportunity for credit card fraud offenders such as by increasing 
consumer awareness and thus improving their resistance to fraud attacks. 
Additionally, technology-based protection such as smartcard makes it more difficult 
for offenders in committing offences such as counterfeit card fraud. Consumers’ 
higher resistance means that they will be less suitable as fraud targets. Additionally, 
measures such as smartcard technology will make stolen credit cards valueless as it 
will be very difficult to use them for fraudulent purposes due to the encryption 
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technology within. Similarly, with more robust identity management system, 
application fraud becomes very difficult to commit.  
 
Each measure has its strengths as well as weaknesses in protecting Indonesia from 
credit card fraud in particular, and payments fraud in general. Generally, future 
improvements for credit card fraud prevention in Indonesia include: improving the 
reliability of fraud data collection and dissemination, designing better fraud 
prevention policy which can establish a standard of sound credit card fraud 
prevention practice, implementing additional technology which can increase the 
difficulty of offenders in committing their offences online and offline, developing a 
balanced identity management system and improving the skills of law enforcement 
personnel to uphold the new law on information and communication technology. 
Continuous improvements must always be kept in motion to cope with the rapidly 
changing environment that may include the introduction of new prevention measures 
or improvements on existing ones. 
 
Nevertheless, in implementing the above initiatives, considerations need to be made 
on the costs and benefits thereof. The Single Identification Number (SIN), for 
example, when applied excessively will result in more disadvantages than benefits to 
the society (Prabowo, 2010). The same applies to other measures such as the 
smartcard technology which requires substantial investments by banks and financial 
institutions to make it up and running. In principle, the desired end results from credit 
card fraud prevention practices in the payments system is that the benefits thereof 
must exceed the costs (Prabowo, 2010). This is also related to the efficiency in using 
the available resources to achieve the objective of crime prevention practices. This 
also signifies the need for reliable fraud data collection, management and distribution 
which represents efforts to understand what the actual problems are and how 
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